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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Every day, in public defender offices around the country, thousands of 
criminal lawyers step outside of their constitutional mandate.  They find drug 
treatment programs and jobs for their clients.  They intervene with landlords and 
child welfare services.  They worry about whether their clients have transportation, 
or appropriate clothing for an interview.  In sum, they provide a wide array of 
social services and legal aid that make them look less like the traditional defense 
attorneys contemplated by Gideon v. Wainwright and more like social workers.
1
 
At the same time, in schools, welfare offices, and public hospitals, civil 
servants are also operating outside their traditional job descriptions.  Teachers are 
calling the police and sending students to probation offices.  Welfare case 
managers monitor their clients for fraud and refer them to prosecutors.  Emergency 
rooms are providing opportunities to catch and arrest people with open warrants.  
In other words, these institutions of the welfare state are engaged in a wide array of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
*
   Associate Dean for Research, Rains Senior Research Fellow & Professor of Law, Loyola 
Law School, Los Angeles.  Many thanks to George Thomas for putting together this symposium.  In 
Judges, the Lord tells the prophet Gideon to tear down the altar to the heathen god Baal and replace it 
with a “proper kind of altar . . . .  So Gideon took ten of his servants and did as the Lord told him.”  6 
Judges 25–27 (New International Version). 
1   Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system of criminal 
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided for him.”). 
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criminal functions that make them look less like service providers and more like 
law enforcement officers.  
These two phenomena are the flip sides of the same coin.  Public defenders 
and other criminal justice actors are morphing into service providers in response to 
the tight connection between criminalization and their clients’ poverty, the same 
connection that drives teachers and welfare caseworkers to treat their poor clients 
as presumptive criminals.
2
  This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the 
“criminalization of poverty:” namely, that many aspects of being poor have been 
rendered criminal.
3
  The homeless are punished for sleeping on the street.
4
  
Working women are punished for their lack of access to childcare.
5
  The poor are 
punished for their dependence on government benefits or informal sources of 
income.
6
   
But the phenomenon also includes the converse: brushes with the criminal 
system tend to make people poor.  They do so directly by imposing fines and fees, 
and indirectly by making it harder to get jobs, credit, and other resources.
7
  
Moreover, because the social safety net itself is retracting, the criminal justice 
system has become a “peculiar social service” for the incarcerated and their 
families.
8
  In all these ways, the criminal system and the welfare state knit poverty 
and criminality together, functionally as well as ideologically, norm by norm, and 
encounter by encounter.  Public defenders are responding to this tight nexus by 
providing poverty-sensitive legal representation, even as welfare workers are 
reacting to it by treating the poor as “latent criminals.”9 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2    See infra Part II. 
3   See generally LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF 
SOCIAL INSECURITY (Duke Univ. Press 2009). 
4   NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES, 7 (2014), available at 
http://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place (documenting the numerous laws that criminalize 
homeless activities). 
5   KAARYN GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION 
OF POVERTY 91 (2012) (describing mothers who lost welfare benefits because they could not find 
childcare for their children and therefore could not work); see also SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF 
THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR 26–29 (2009) (describing network of 
illegal childcare operations in low-income neighborhoods). 
6   See generally GUSTAFSON, supra note 5; VENKATESH, supra note 5.  
7   See generally Alexes Harris, Heather Evans, & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from 
Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOCIOL. 
1753 (2010); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION (2007).   
8   MEGAN COMFORT, DOING TIME TOGETHER: LOVE AND FAMILY IN THE SHADOW OF PRISON 
18, 182 (2008) (“[T]he oddly beneficial functions of the penitentiary arise predominantly in the 
absence of social-welfare institutions traditionally charged with such roles: job-placement and drug-
treatment programs, mental health services, domestic violence shelters, and individual and family 
counseling.”). 
9
   GUSTAFSON, supra note 5, at 1. 
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This criminal-civil convergence is peculiar to what I call the bottom of the 
“penal pyramid,”10 the world of minor offenses and urban poverty in which crime, 
unemployment, racial segregation, and lack of social services swirl around in one 
large, nearly inextricable mass.  The legal threat of a minor criminal conviction, 
fine, and/or brief stint in jail typically arises alongside an array of other common 
threats to a defendant’s wellbeing such as eviction, unemployment, addiction, and 
other health problems.  It means that public defenders must contend with their 
clients’ poverty as both cause and effect of their involvement with the criminal 
system. 
At the same time, lawyers who work at the bottom must also grapple with the 
distinct legal culture of minor case processing which is infamous for its quick-and-
dirty “assembly line” quality.  Hundreds of cases are pled out in standard fashion, 
and courts are typically uninterested in hearing about individual cases, the 
evidence, or the possibility of litigation.
11
  For many defenders, the institutional 
demands of docket clearing and the pressure to enter standardized pleas strip them 
of the ability to act as traditional legal advocates in the Gideon sense.
12
  In this 
way, the legal process ironically discourages attention to legal outcomes, 
especially in the face of clients’ other pressing needs.13 
By contrast, the legal culture—and thus the role of counsel—looks very 
different at the top of the penal pyramid where offenses are more serious or where 
defendants and counsel have better resources.
14
  Federal and other serious offenses 
tend to eclipse the daily burdens of a defendant’s poverty and bring stark clarity to 
the roles of the legal actors involved.  Thirty-year drug sentences, like securities 
fraud and other well-litigated cases, demand sustained attention not only from the 
lawyers, but from trial and appellate courts and even the public, creating an 
environment in which lawyers can authentically assume the traditional legal 
adversarial role contemplated by Gideon.  While defendants at the top are still 
overwhelmingly indigent,
15
 their poverty is overshadowed by the magnitude of 
their cases.  The demands of the serious criminal case and the meaningful 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10   Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2012) [hereinafter 
Misdemeanors]; see also Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND SOCIOLOGY IN CONVERSATION (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff 
eds., forthcoming 2015). 
11  Misdemeanors, supra note 10.  
12  See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049 
(2013) (exploring this phenomenon in detail).  
13  See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008) (arguing 
that it is often more efficient for innocent misdemeanor defendants to plead guilty). 
14  Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 10, at 1317 (describing the careful legal culture at the 
top of the pyramid). 
15  MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009 8 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf 
(seventy-six percent of federal defendants qualify for appointed counsel.). 
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opportunity to litigate thus define the lawyer’s role in ways that minor cases often 
do not. 
This Essay contemplates the phenomenon of civil-criminal role-blending at 
the bottom of the penal pyramid where offenses are pettiest and defendants are 
poorest.  In this realm, public defenders are not the only ones redefining their jobs 
outside the classic adversarial process.  Specialty courts (such as drug, mental 
health, and veterans’ courts) provide treatment, counseling, and moral support to 
defendants in lieu of traditional punishments.
16
  Police in some cities are engaging 
in street-level diversion, channeling addicts into treatment and the homeless into 
shelters instead of jails.
17
  Prosecutors have started “community prosecution” 
programs aimed at preventing crime and engaging neighborhood issues.
18
  In all 
these ways, the criminalization of poverty imposes welfarist responsibilities on 
criminal justice actors, even as it pushes civil workers into more punitive law 
enforcement roles.  The results can be ideologically confusing.
19
  In the land of 
misdemeanors, order maintenance policing, drug courts, public schools and public 
housing, it is ironically common for lawyers and law enforcement to use 
punishment to get poor people welfare benefits, and for welfare providers to 
leverage benefits to get poor people punished.   
Public defenders sit squarely on top of this institutional and ideological fault 
line.  Not only do they have a unique constitutional mandate as legal advocates for 
poor criminals, they have also long accepted a broader service role than that 
contemplated by Gideon.
20
  Nevertheless, their role-shifting should be understood 
as part of a larger cross-institutional phenomenon.  In essence, we cannot 
understand what public defenders do without understanding what the criminal 
system looks like, and we cannot understand what the criminal system looks like 
without surveying all the players and institutions—civil as well as criminal—who 
makes up its daily operations and normative commitments.
21
  When we do, we see 
that the criminalization of poverty has created a world of low-level criminal justice 
in which the various institutions that manage poverty—from public defender 
offices to emergency rooms—are struggling to define their obligations in ways that 
often cause them to converge as well as clash. 
This symposium is entitled “The Failures of Gideon and New Paths Forward.”  
A central part of the Gideon crisis is the failure to recognize that we have 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
16  See infra Part III.A. 
17  See infra Part III.C. 
18  See infra Part III.B. 
19  See David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 765, 
767–68 (2001) (describing the importance of “institutional segregation” in which different 
institutions are entrusted with protecting different values). 
20  See infra Part IV. 
21  See generally Mona Lynch, The Situated Actor and the Production of Punishment: 
Towards an Empirical Social Psychology of Criminal Procedure, in A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND SOCIOLOGY IN CONVERSATION, supra note 10. 
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conscripted public defenders to do far more than represent individual clients in 
legal cases.  We have made them advocates for the socially dispossessed at the 
bottom of the criminal justice pyramid where a client’s problems can range from 
personal poverty and drug addiction to structural exclusion from housing and labor 
markets.  We’ve put similar pressure on police, emergency room health workers, 
and welfare case managers, all of whom must contend with the inextricably tight 
relationships between poverty, social disadvantage, and the operation of the 
criminal system.  As a result, the formalist Gideon framework of law and 
adversariality—a relatively accurate depiction of lawyering in serious cases—falls 
apart as a descriptive mechanism at the bottom. 
A note on generalizations: this Essay often discusses what public defenders 
“do” or think they should do in an ideal setting.  In practice, most public defenders 
do not and cannot perform all the functions that their job demands.  The public 
defense bar is infamously overwhelmed and many defenders cannot even manage 
their official caseloads—particularly their misdemeanor caseloads—much less 
provide additional social services to their clients.
22
  But some of the best public 
defender offices in the country are well-resourced, peopled by select lawyers, and 
provide the highest levels of legal representation comparable to any elite private 
sector firm.  These offices have pioneered a variety of broad service-oriented 
models, sometimes referred to as “client-centered” or “holistic” representation.23  
In other words, when public defenders actually have the time and resources to fully 
occupy their roles, they often conclude that being a public defender includes a 
service-oriented, welfarist approach that recognizes the links between their clients’ 
criminality and poverty.  While most defenders may not be able to provide such 
services, we can nevertheless draw powerful lessons from the fact that leading 
defender institutions have taken this route.  
This Essay proceeds as follows.  First, it briefly surveys the criminalization of 
the welfare state through such institutions as schools, welfare offices, hospitals, 
and immigration.  It then charts the opposing forces—the welfarization of the 
criminal process—and how courts, prosecutors, and police have increasingly taken 
on the roles of service providers to the poor.  It then considers the special bridging 
function of the public defender, and concludes with some thoughts about what 
these convergences tell us about the social function of the petty offense process 
more generally.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
22  See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, 
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 
9–17 (2009).  
23  See infra Part IV. 
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II. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE WELFARE STATE 
 
Over the past thirty years, the U.S. criminal system has famously grown more 
punitive and less committed to rehabilitation and individual offender reform.
24
  
Conversely, the welfare state has become increasingly committed to punishment.  
Or, to put it more theoretically, the demise of “penal welfarism” has brought with 
it a kind of “welfare punitiveness” in which once-benign state welfare functions 
have morphed into quasi-criminal modes of control and punishment.
25
   
Perhaps the most infamous criminalization of a core social service has 
occurred in the so-called “school-to-prison pipeline,” in which public education 
has been transformed into an encounter with the criminal system for thousands of 
children.
26
  Police, prosecutors, and probation officers have taken up residence in 
public schools.  Infractions that once led to a trip to the principal’s office and a call 
to a child’s parents have now become the basis for criminal charges and referral to 
the juvenile system.  The impact of this criminalization has been heaviest on 
children of color: seventy percent of arrested students are African American or 
Latino and minority boys are more likely to be arrested, referred to law 
enforcement, suspended or expelled than their white counterparts for comparable 
behavior.
27
 
This infiltration by criminal justice norms is repeating itself across the 
institutional spectrum.  For example, in Cheating Welfare, Kaaryn Gustafson 
describes how the modern welfare system relies heavily on criminal charges and 
punishment as a way of managing welfare caseloads and benefits.
28
  Recipients are 
routinely charged with crimes and punished for minor violations of the welfare 
rules; case managers have been known to refer clients to prosecutors without 
telling them that they were being investigated for criminal offenses.
29
  As 
Gustafson puts it more broadly: 
 
Policing the poor and protecting taxpayer dollars from fraud and abuse 
have taken priority over providing security to economically vulnerable 
parents and children.  Today’s welfare system treats those who use 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
24   See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); DAVID GARLAND, 
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002); FRANCIS 
A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981). 
25  WACQUANT, supra note 3, at 197, 299. 
26  See generally CATHERINE KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING 
LEGAL REFORM (2010); Samantha Buckingham, A Tale of Two Systems: How Schools and Juvenile 
Courts are Failing Students, 13 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 179 (2013). 
27  Buckingham, supra note 26, at 189–90.  See also KIMBERLE WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, 
PRISCILLA OCEN & JYOTI NANDA, BLACK GIRLS MATTER: PUSHED OUT, OVERPOLICED AND 
UNDERPROTECTED (2015) (documenting similar discriminatory practices towards black girls).  
28  See generally GUSTAFSON, supra note 5.   
29  Id. at 51–68 (describing broad overlaps between welfare and criminal justice apparatus). 
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public benefits, or who even apply for benefits, as latent criminals.  
Nationwide, welfare recipients are treated as presumptive liars, cheaters, 
and thieves.  Their lives are heavily surveilled and regulated, not only by 
the welfare system, but also by the criminal justice system.
30
 
 
Health care providers and institutions have also taken on a punitive cast.  For 
decades, public hospitals have drug-tested poor pregnant women of color, referring 
them for prosecution when they test positive.
31
  In that same punitive spirit, Alice 
Goffman describes how Philadelphia police monitor hospitals and emergency 
rooms for people with outstanding warrants, checking the names of patients and 
those who accompany them.
32
  As a result, family members and friends will often 
avoid coming to the hospital or visiting the injured, while men may even miss the 
birth of their children for fear of arrest.  A study of the emergency room admitting 
policies of a large public hospital in Los Angeles found similar results.  Emergency 
room nurses used criminally-inflected criteria and stereotypes—for example 
whether they believed patients were associated with criminal activity—to allocate 
and withhold emergency medical treatment.
33
  These confluences have led one 
researcher to conclude that “the urban poor’s access to healthcare is mediated . . . 
by incarceration, policing, and crime control language.”34 
The immigration administration has also become a heavily criminalized 
regime not only of exclusion, but punishment.  Indeed, as the popular term 
“crimmigration” suggests, the immigration system is now so tightly intertwined 
with the criminal process that it is often hard to distinguish the two.
35
  A vast array 
of minor criminal behaviors have become grounds for deportation, even where 
there is no conviction, and 90 percent of all deportations are triggered by 
criminalized behavior.
36
  Immigration has also become a site of over-
criminalization in its own right: half of all federal prosecutions are for immigration 
crimes.
37
  Even the apparatuses have become intertwined, as police forces 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
30  Id. at 1. 
31  Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657, 1676–77 (2008); 
see also Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, 
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). 
32  ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY 34–35 (2014). 
33  Armando Lara-Millan, Public Emergency Room Overcrowding in the Era of Mass 
Imprisonment, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 866, 873 (2014). 
34  Id. at 880. 
35  Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 379–92 (2006). 
36  Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1128 (2013). 
37  Jennifer M. Chacon, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 
651 (2012). 
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increasingly make immigration enforcement part of their local function.
38
  In these 
ways, what was once a civil administrative matter has become a criminalized, 
punitive arena.  
Schools, welfare offices, public hospitals, and immigration are governmental 
functions.  But criminalization travels unofficial routes as well, and its story would 
be incomplete without recognizing its impact on the private employment sector.
39
  
Today’s labor market is so heavily influenced by workers’ criminal records—
particularly for African American men—that a person’s employability and 
economic viability is inextricably intertwined with his criminal justice exposure.  
As Devah Pager has explained:  
 
The ‘credential’ of a criminal record, like educational or professional 
credentials, constitutes a formal and enduring classification of social 
status, which can be used to regulate access and opportunity across 
numerous social, economic, and political domains.  
. . .  [In particular, employers] view this credential as an indicator of 
general employability or trustworthiness.
40
   
 
Because Americans continue to stereotype black men as criminals, this 
negative credentialing has crushing economic consequences for African 
Americans, even those without criminal records.  Indeed, the assumption that black 
men have been criminalized is so stigmatizing and pervasive that an African 
American man without a record may be just as unlikely to get a job as a white man 
with an actual criminal conviction.
41
  The private market for work has thus 
imported the normative judgments and racial skew of the criminal system to such 
an extent that unemployability has become a collateral consequence of a criminal 
conviction.
42
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
38  Eagly, supra note 36, at 1130 (“[I]mmigration enforcement is now deeply intertwined with 
the local enforcement of criminal law.”). 
39  See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of 
Mass Incarceration, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012) (“[A] new civil death is meted out to 
persons convicted of crimes in the form of a substantial and permanent change in legal status, 
operationalized by a network of collateral consequences.”). 
40  PAGER, supra note 7, at 4–5.  
41  In Pager’s experiment, black testers with no criminal record were as unlikely to get jobs as 
white testers with convictions on their records.  Id. at 91 (“[B]eing black in America today is just 
about the same as having a felony conviction in terms of one’s chances of finding a job.”).   
42  Various states have tried to push back by delinking the criminal system from employment.  
These efforts include “ban the box” rules that prohibit employers from asking about criminal records, 
and rules against reporting criminal records to employers.  See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Criminal 
Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y. 963, 979–87 (2013).  The 
Delaware Labor Department has created an expungement program, stating that it has “identified 
criminal records as a significant barrier to entering the workforce for the TANF [Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families] population.”  About Us, THE STATE OF DELAWARE, 
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In all these ways, the public civil apparatus—from schools to welfare to the 
workplace—has incorporated the tools and values of the criminal system in ways 
that have rendered it less generous, more punitive, and more exclusionary.  
Whether we label it “the criminalization of poverty”43 or more broadly “governing 
through crime,”44 the underlying lesson is the same: civil actors and institutions 
increasingly view their roles and clients through lenses and categorizations 
provided by the criminal process.  
 
III. PUTTING WELFARE BACK INTO CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
The description above is part of a widely-told story about the neo-liberal 
demise of the welfare state and penal welfarism in particular.
45
  But it is not the 
whole story.  Various criminal law officials and institutions are slowly 
reintroducing a welfare-like approach to offenders, from community policing to 
drug courts.  Particularly in connection with low-level offenses such as drugs and 
quality-of-life, police, prosecutors, judges, and sheriffs are tempering their roles as 
purveyors of retributive punishment and embracing concerns and policies more 
typically associated with the social safety net.
46
 
To be clear, this new welfarist impulse is not necessarily generous or even 
benign.  Some programs are driven not by a resurgence of empathy for offenders, 
but by the need to reduce dockets and jail populations.
47
  Other reforms, like drug 
courts, may actually increase the reach and intrusiveness of the criminal system, or 
exacerbate existing inequalities.
48
  But even with such ambivalences, these new 
forms of offender management provide significant treatment, diversion, and other 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://apex.delawareworks.com/about.php (last visited May 18, 2015).  My thanks to Ben Fleury-
Steiner for this insight. 
43  GUSTAFSON, supra note 5.  
44  See SIMON, supra note 24.  
45  E.g., GARLAND, supra note 24, at 75.  
46  See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, The Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaning of 
Imprisonment from John Howard to Brown v. Plata, 48 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 217, 245 (2013) 
(forecasting a possible resurgence of the “medical” or rehabilitative model of corrections). 
47  See e.g., Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and its Impact on Local Criminal 
Justice Systems, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 329 (2014) (describing “mixed reviews” of 
California’s response to the Supreme Court’s order to reduce the prison population); Armando Lara-
Millan & Nicole Van Cleve, Punishment as Privilege: Denying Rights and Resources in the 
Overburdened Gateways of Mass Imprisonment, (unpublished manuscript) (draft presented at the 
2014 meeting of the Law & Society Association) (documenting how California sheriff departments 
are offering jail inmates “early release” onto probation for lack of bed spaces).   
48  Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial 
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1561 (2004) (on net-widening); see also Josh Bowers, 
Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 792 (2008) (on how drug court participants 
often receive longer sentences than they would have under a traditional sentencing regime). 
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welfare enhancing services to an offender population once written off as 
incorrigible.
49
   
 
A. Specialty Courts 
 
Perhaps the most overtly welfarist turn of the criminal system is occurring in 
so-called “problem-solving” courts.  The explosion of these specialty courts—they 
exist in every jurisdiction and there are thousands of them—reflects a renewed 
commitment to the idea that criminal punishment should serve as a vehicle for 
rehabilitation and the reintegration of offenders into the law-abiding community.
50
  
From drug treatment to mental health services to job training, specialized courts 
address addiction, mental health problems, veterans’ issues, prostitution, and other 
social challenges once seen as the bailiwick of the welfare state.  
The typical drug court, for example, siphons offenders out of the traditional 
criminal process and substitutes supervision, treatment, and an extensive program 
of intervention for jail.  In the effort to provide effective treatment rather than 
traditional punishment, the legal actors’ roles are upended.  The drug court 
“treatment team” consists of the defendant, judge, defense attorney, and 
prosecutor, players who are traditionally locked in non-cooperative, adversarial 
relationships.  Instead, the “prosecutor and defender become partners collaborating 
in an effort to rehabilitate the addicted client” and the judge’s “primary role shifts 
from the determination of guilt to the provision of therapeutic aid.”51  “The judge 
‘will frequently engage in a dialogue with the offender,’ adopting the roles of 
‘confessor, taskmaster, cheerleader, and mentor; in turn exhorting, threatening, 
encouraging and congratulating the participant for his or her progress, or lack 
thereof.’”52  Unlike the neutral arbiter of tradition, drug court judges are intimately 
involved in providing medical and personal support to criminal defendants, much 
like treatment providers themselves.  
To be sure, problem-solving courts are still criminal justice institutions, and 
the punitive, controlling quality of the surveillance and control they impose on 
offenders distinguishes them from true welfare providers such as hospitals, mental 
health services, or voluntary drug treatment programs.
53
  As Jane Spinak has noted, 
“[t]here are serious questions to ask about why we like trying to fix the problem at 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
49  Cf. GARLAND, supra note 24, at 58 (describing the rejection of the rehabilitative ideal and 
the dominant criminological belief that “nothing works”). 
50  Miller, supra note 48, at 1561; see also Bowers, supra note 48, at 792. 
51  Miller, supra note 48, at 1492–93. 
52  Id. at 1493. 
53  See id. at 1487 (arguing that drug courts are still punitive).  See also Bowers, supra note 48, 
at 783 (pointing out that drug courts often lead to longer sentences); COMFORT, supra note 8, at 18, 
196 (“The fact that a close investigation finds counterintuitive ‘benefits’ to incarceration does not 
override the much more obvious and amply documented destructive efforts of forced separation and 
confinement on family ties, children’s welfare, and community life.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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the back end, by the time we get to court, rather than trying to address the issues 
before people ever have to go into the criminal justice system in the first place.”54  
Nevertheless, this rehabilitative alternative to traditional punishment has become 
firmly entrenched in the U.S. criminal process, showcasing judges’ potential 
welfarist roles and making it part and parcel of the experience of offenders and 
their attorneys. 
 
B. Community Prosecution 
 
The idea that the criminal system should prevent and treat, as well as punish, 
has made its way into other core law enforcement functions.  Around the country, 
prosecutors are opening offices in high-crime neighborhoods, reaching out to 
residents, and reframing their jobs as community servants rather than just case 
prosecutors.
55
  From San Francisco to Indianapolis to Washington D.C., the 
prosecutorial function is increasingly seen not only in terms of law enforcement, 
but also crime prevention and community service.  Under this view, “‘doing 
justice’ brings new goals: reducing and preventing crime, . . . and strengthening 
bonds with citizens, governmental and law enforcement agencies, and civic groups 
to establish and secure a community capacity for enhancing security and 
promoting justice.” 56 
Community prosecution takes different forms.  Some offices have relocated 
into housing projects and storefronts.  Others send prosecutors into high-crime 
communities to attend community meetings and hear residents’ concerns.57  
Former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder described how he revised the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office when he arrived as follows:  
 
As a local prosecutor, I realized that I could be far more effective in 
addressing the crime problem if I deployed some of my attorneys into the 
community where they could develop special relationships with members 
of the police department, businesses, non-profit organizations, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
54  Leon Neyfakh, The Custom Justice of “Problem-Solving Courts,” BOSTON GLOBE (March 
23, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/03/22/the-custom-justice-problem-solving-
courts/PQJLC758Sgw7qQhiefT6MM/story.html. 
55  Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 
345 (2002) (surveying growth in community prosecution nationwide); see also Anthony Alfieri, 
Community Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465 (2002). 
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eds., 2008).  See also Center for Court Innovation, Community Prosecution, 
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(“Community prosecution is founded on the idea that prosecutors have a responsibility not only to 
prosecute cases but to solve public safety problems, prevent crime and improve public confidence in 
the justice system.”).  
57  Thompson, supra note 55, at 345–46; Alfieri, supra note 55, at 1473–74. 
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educational institutions, the faith community and, of course, the citizens 
themselves.  In doing so, I found that we were better able to respond to 
the community's needs.
58
 
 
Community prosecution moves prosecutors away from their traditional 
litigious, case-oriented role and towards a more community-oriented service model 
in which prosecuting crime is seen as a form of direct service to communities and 
their residents.  Prosecutors thus take their place alongside other official service 
providers, providing the benefits of safer streets, government responsiveness, and 
improved quality of life. 
While it would be a stretch to say that community prosecution transforms 
prosecutors into poverty workers, the concept implicitly acknowledges the tight 
connections between crime and social disadvantage.  In some instances, it 
explicitly recognizes the criminalization of poverty.  In Vermont, for example, one 
State’s Attorney began a diversion program for low-level misdemeanors in direct 
response to the crime-poverty nexus: 
 
[W]hen I became a prosecutor first in Philadelphia, and then in 
Burlington, Vermont, it was not lost on me that we were prosecuting 
people, both African-Americans and white people, who came from 
poverty, who came from places with a lack of resources.  They came 
from marginalized places in the world and I began to realize that we 
were continuing to marginalize them through the criminal justice system, 
whether it be for drug prosecution or mental health illnesses that caused 
criminal behavior.
59
 
 
In lieu of prosecution, the Burlington Vermont diversion program refers 
offenders to social service programs such as job training and drug treatment.  In 
effect, this version of community-based prosecution is a reincarnation of old-
school penal welfarism: the impulse to proactively address the needs of the poor 
through the operation of the criminal system.  
 
C. Police 
 
Nowhere is the welfarist impulse in law enforcement more complex and 
conflicted than in the police function.  Doctrinally speaking, police are treated 
mainly as law enforcement actors; their authority flows from the existence of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
58  Thompson, supra note 55, at 345 (quoting U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder). 
59  Center for Court Innovation, Podcast: The Evolution of a Prosecutor: Early Intervention 
Improves Safety and Saves Money, http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/podcast-evolution-
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2014). 
2015] GIDEON’S SERVANTS 457 
 
 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause that “crimes” have been committed.60  But 
as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, police interactions with citizens “are 
incredibly rich in diversity,”61 and Fourth Amendment doctrine barely captures the 
wide variety of police functions and practices that go far beyond the “competitive 
work of ferreting out crime.”62   
As part of this diversity, police have a well-established “community 
caretaking” function.63  This includes giving directions to the lost traveler, rescuing 
the injured,
64
 and, in the iconic case, helping ducklings across busy intersections.
65
  
Indeed, historically speaking, the “police function” was not limited to crime at all: 
it included regulatory matters, public safety, and the maintenance of public order 
above and beyond the enforcement of specific criminal laws.
66
 
Today’s police engage in wide array of functions that look suspiciously like 
social work.  For example, police in Los Angeles’s infamous Skid Row use their 
authority to channel the homeless into shelters and rehabilitation programs.  One 
senior police officer lauded “the rehabilitative aspects of skid row” and the 
accompanying police function as follows: 
 
The majority of the community desires to make skid row a true 
community for individuals struggling with the disease of addiction, 
homelessness, and mental illness. . . . [A]n environment conducive to 
change in the lives of people struggling with a variety of issues . . . where 
people can have a better chance of taking their lives back.
67
 
 
Forrest Stuart calls these police “resource managers,” contrasting their 
welfarist function within the marginal space of Skid Row with the more 
conventional punitive and exclusionary role they play in wealthier “primary” 
spaces.  While in wealthy neighborhoods and gentrified downtowns, police are 
often seen as dehumanizing the homeless and attempting to hide them from view, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
60  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). 
61  Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. 
62  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
63  Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 261 (1998). 
64  Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
65  ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, MAKE WAY FOR DUCKLINGS (1941) (in which Officer Michael helps 
Mrs. Mallard and her family of ducklings to cross the street to get to Boston Gardens). 
66  MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT 49, 53–59 (2005) (describing the far reaching peace-keeping powers of British and 
colonial police); see also George C. Thomas, III, Stumbling Towards History: The Framers’ Search 
and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 199, 201, 226–29 (2010) (“What [founding-era] constables 
did not do was investigate crime.”).  
67  Forrest Stuart, From ‘Rabble Management’ to ‘Recovery Management’: Policing 
Homelessness in Marginal Urban Space, 51 URB. STUD. 1909, 1914 (2014). 
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Skid Row policing “rehumanizes” the homeless by attempting to get them into 
shelters and programs.
68
 
The failures of the wars on crime, gangs, and drugs have spawned other 
“resource management” approaches to policing.  In Boston, police instituted a 
famously successful cooperative endeavor with a group of clergy called the Ten 
Point Coalition, clinical social workers, and other service providers, to extract 
young, violent gang members from their dysfunctional criminal milieu.  Police and 
sheriffs also began the Boston Reentry Initiative, which offers serious offenders 
job training, vocational opportunities, drug, mental health, and other services to 
help them reintegrate into society upon release.
69
   
In Seattle, police have instituted a street-level diversion program in which 
police “take drug and prostitution offenders—among the main staples of the 
criminal justice mill—to rehabilitative and social support services rather than 
criminal processing on select days.”70  The effort mirrors comparable pre-booking 
diversion programs that channel the mentally ill into treatment rather than jail.
71
  
As Mary Fan describes these efforts, “[r]ather than acting as the muscular arm of 
the incarcerating state, police serve as the first screen of an offender’s suitability 
for rehabilitation and community reintegration.”72 
These approaches go above and beyond the general commitment to 
“community policing.”  Broadly speaking, community policing “exhorts city 
police departments to forswear their autonomy and collaborate with practically 
everyone: community groups and institutions, property owners, agencies of city 
government, other police and security forces, elected officials, businesses.”73  Like 
the community prosecution movement, which it spawned, community policing 
embraces the notion that police provide services to residents above and beyond the 
tracking down of criminals.  But the police programs described above take the 
notion a step further, connecting residents more firmly to the welfare state—
                                                                                                                                                   
 
68  Id. at 1923–24 (“By manipulating behavioural incentives, these policing practices aim to 
‘reprogramme’ homeless individuals to make the ‘right’ choice and, through collaboration with the 
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69  Anthony Braga et al., Controlling Violent Offenders Released to the Community: An 
Evaluation of the Boston Reentry Initiative, 46 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 411, 413, 417 (2009); 
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70  Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 166 (2013). 
71  Id. at 168. 
72  Id. at 167. 
73  Thacher, supra note 19, at 765 (analyzing eleven different community policing programs); 
see also James Forman Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
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whether it takes the form of a homeless shelter, a drug treatment program, or a 
hospital—and the benefits it provides. 
To be clear, the expansion of the police’s welfarist role does not necessarily 
lessen or eliminate their law enforcement commitments.  Indeed, police penetration 
into the welfare state often increases their punitive reach.  Los Angeles police 
bring arrestees to the emergency room not only to provide them treatment, but to 
create opportunities for interrogation.
74
  Seattle police have broad discretion over 
who gets into diversion treatment programs, raising the risk of further racial 
selectivity.
75
  Many worry that community policing more generally erodes civil 
liberties and privacy in neighborhoods where police have greater access to private 
spaces and personal information.
76
  Each of these new functions complements and 
strengthens the traditional law enforcement role.  But the examples above 
complicate the adversarial and punitive images of police, and illustrate how even 
this quintessential law enforcement function may be taking on a more civil 
welfarist character. 
 
IV. THE BRIDGING ROLE OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
 
Public defenders have long grappled with the non-criminal needs of their 
clients.  They find them drug treatment programs, bus tokens, and clothing for job 
interviews.  They develop relationships with them, their families, and their 
children.  Robin Steinberg, co-founder of the Bronx Defenders, once brought her 
heroin-addicted client home with her for a couple of days so as to ensure her 
appearance for trial, an act Steinberg describes as something “only a young public 
defender would do.”77 
For the most part, right-to-counsel doctrine has not recognized counsel’s 
expansive caretaking function, although that may be changing.  In Padilla v. 
Kentucky, the Court concluded that at least one non-criminal consequence of 
conviction—deportation—is so significant that attorneys must advise their clients 
about it.
78
  Since then, numerous scholars have argued that Padilla opens the door 
to a broader conception of the defense attorney role.  Jack Chin, for example, 
maintains that part of what “defense lawyers are for” is to help clients handle a 
wide array of collateral consequences—from employment to housing to 
immigration—and that Padilla is the first step in formalizing those functions as 
part of the Gideon/Strickland inquiry into whether counsel has provided effective 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
74  Lara-Millan, supra note 33, at 879.  
75  Fan, supra note 70, at 192–93. 
76  E.g., Carol Steiker, More Wrong Than Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN 
INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 49 (Tracey L. Meares et al.,eds., 1999). 
77  Robin G. Steinberg, Beyond Lawyering: How Holistic Representation Makes for Good 
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assistance.
79
  More broadly, many argue that the vast array of collateral 
consequences that the criminal system now imposes on offenders should be 
understood more centrally as punishment in their own right and therefore an 
appropriate arena for defense counsel intervention.
80
 
The collateral consequences debate reflects a more general reality: that 
standard questions of guilt and innocence are not always central—and may even be 
peripheral—to the significance of a low-level case for a client and the concomitant 
role of their lawyer.  This is in part because the personal and civil consequences of 
conviction, especially for poor African Americans, have expanded so dramatically 
and have become so burdensome that responsible lawyers cannot reasonably 
ignore them.  But it also reflects how the system itself, particularly the 
misdemeanor process, has structurally sidelined questions of guilt.  Assembly-line 
courts do not provide much opportunity for litigation and the system is heavily 
weighted towards pleas.
81
  In that world, a lawyer’s job is not so much about 
avoiding conviction—everyone assumes the defendant will plead—but haggling 
over its consequences, personal, civil, and pragmatic, as well as the more formally 
criminal.   
These realities have led some of the best public defender offices in the 
country to embrace a variety of new work models.  Variously referred to as 
“holistic representation,” “community-oriented representation,” or “client-centered 
representation,” these offices conceptualize themselves as full service advocates 
for the poor communities from which their clients come.
82
  For example, the Bronx 
Defenders work in teams of defense attorneys, civil welfare attorneys, social 
workers, and parent advocates.  Its lawyers are trained in interdisciplinary fields 
including social work, immigration, and mental health.
83
  The Georgia Justice 
Project provides not only criminal defense, but also GED classes, employment 
placements, and other social services.
84
  In Portland, the public defender office 
hires legal assistants and outreach coordinators from the community, including 
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“reporters, nuns, bartenders, college professors, high school dropouts, and home-
makers,” to find alternative services and programs for their clients.85  
Even for public defenders whose offices have not specifically embraced these 
holistic models, a large part of the public defender role includes finding social 
services for their needy clients.  A classic example is the lawyer representing a 
drug-addicted client, looking for ways to translate her client’s criminal case into 
drug treatment.  Public defenders may use competency hearings to get their clients 
mental health treatment.
86
  Travis County, Texas even created a mental health 
public defender office specifically designed to represent and seek treatment for 
mentally-ill, indigent defendants.
87
  In these ways, public defenders recognize, 
implicitly or explicitly, that part of their responsibility to their clients includes 
working up their welfare needs, even though Gideon and Strickland do not 
contemplate such duties. 
Perhaps the largest deviation from the individualistic Gideon model can be 
seen in some defender offices’ decision to leverage their institutional roles to affect 
criminal justice policy.  The Bronx Defenders have staff members dedicated to 
policy and community development.
88
  The Pace Criminal Justice Clinic helped 
form a city-wide advocacy coalition to end the zero-tolerance policing practices 
that ensnared many of the clinic’s clients.89   
This kind of institutional advocacy is not free from controversy and it poses 
special challenges to the conception of the public defender.  First and foremost, it 
is potentially in conflict with the standard Gideon-based individualized client 
model.
90
  Policies that might help a group of defendants or a community may not 
be good for an individual client.
91
  The model may even encourage the very same 
sort of cherry-picking for which drug courts have been criticized, skimming off 
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sympathetic clients and easier cases while leaving the harder cases to the 
traditional system.
92
 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the move towards community-based and 
holistic defense models brings the criminal process ever closer to the concerns of 
the civil welfare state.  These criminal justice actors are interpreting their legal 
obligations to include social and even political work, precisely because defending 
the indigent is so tightly intertwined with larger social welfare questions of poverty 
and employment, neighborhood disorganization and racial segregation, drug 
addiction and health care.  As defender offices link their clients’ burdens to 
systemic social policies, they not only challenge the individualistic, legalistic 
model contemplated by Gideon, but also transform the criminalization of poverty 
into a live issue for the criminal system as a whole.
93
   
 
V. CRIME, POVERTY, LEGAL ROLES AND RULES 
 
“[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”94 
 
“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on 
the amount of money he has.”95 
 
For over fifty years, Gideon v. Wainwright, and to a lesser extent Griffin v. 
Illinois, have offered a narrow doctrinal response to the criminalization of poverty.  
These cases and their progeny recognize the fundamental proposition that poor 
people often experience the criminal system differently than do the wealthy.
96
  
Their response has been to give such defendants lawyers.
97
  The assumption behind 
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both lines of cases is that counsel can cure the disparities of treatment that the 
criminal system visits on the poor.
98
   
This might be a decent assumption for serious cases, where good defense 
counsel can often even out the legal playing field between rich and poor in a 
variety of ways.  But it does not begin to address the realities of the misdemeanor 
process where legal issues are less salient and case outcomes are intimately tied to 
a wide range of disadvantaged life experiences.  Here, the most serious effects of a 
case on a poor person’s life may not be susceptible to litigation at all: for example, 
the impact on their employability, credit, or family arrangements.     
In other words, at the bottom of the penal pyramid where offenses are minor 
and defendants are poor, the legal aspects of a criminal case are just one piece of a 
larger punitive picture.  The criminalization of poverty and the vast expanse of 
collateral consequences—formal and informal—that attend a conviction mean that 
defense lawyers do not merely engage legal rules, but must evaluate the impact of 
the criminal case on their client’s life situation.  For poor defendants facing minor 
offenses, the complex of socio-legal challenges cannot be resolved through due 
process alone.  To put it another way, at the bottom of the pyramid, due process is 
a weak proxy for good representation.  Public defenders have known this for a long 
time; the Supreme Court has yet to recognize it. 
At the same time, the criminal system is not hermetically sealed.  Other 
players—from social workers to employers to emergency room nurses—drive 
individuals into the system and define the consequences once they get there.  
Gideon’s right to a fair trial and Griffin’s commitment to procedural equality do 
not begin to comprehend what fairness might mean in this complex universe.
99
 
The decreasing relevance of standard right-to-counsel doctrine is a corollary 
of the limited relevance of the adversarial model, especially at the bottom of the 
pyramid.
100
  On the one hand, the assembly-line misdemeanor process is only 
nominally adversarial: most case outcomes are a foregone conclusion.  For low-
level routine cases in high-volume courts, law and evidence rarely control 
outcomes; discovery is minimal if it takes place at all, defenders rarely litigate, and 
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courts do not like when they do.
101
  As Eve Brensike Primus, a former public 
defender, describes it, “I routinely had misdemeanor court judges refuse to address 
legal issues and tell me to save my legal arguments for appeal.”102  In dozens of 
other courts, judges refuse to hear motions or punish attorneys who attempt to 
litigate in the traditional way.
103
  This is not a system in which the adversarial 
model—and therefore Gideon’s promise of adversarial due process—is doing 
much work. 
Just as profoundly, many criminal justice actors—from defense counsel to 
police, prosecutors and judges—have modified their legalistic, adversarial stance.  
Instead, they are engaged in community prosecution, problem-solving courts, and 
holistic representation, namely, quasi- or non-adversarial models in which issues 
other than guilt or innocence take precedence.  These actors may even incorporate 
the aims and norms of the traditional welfare state, casting themselves broadly as 
service providers to a needy population, rather than narrowly as legal adversaries 
in a criminal case.  In this ideologically flexible world, staunch public defenders 
have described themselves as engaged in “crime prevention,” even as police worry 
whether poor people are receiving social services and rehabilitation.
104
 
All this is to say that the criminal system is a deeply conflicted socio-legal 
institution, particularly at the bottom of the penal pyramid where defendants are 
poorest and offenses are pettiest.  While the bottom has been poorly served by the 
standard doctrinal discourse generated by Gideon, it is powerfully shaped and 
illuminated by public defenders, the primary enforcers of Gideon’s promise.105  
The blurring and shifting of the public defender’s role thus mirrors a larger reality: 
not only is the criminalization of poverty eroding the adversarial process, but it is 
also recasting the very purposes of the criminal system.   
                                                                                                                                                   
 
101 See Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor System: Its Problems and Some 
Potential Solutions, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 81–82 (2012).  
102  Id. at 81. 
103 BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 22, at 44–45 (documenting judicial pressure on 
misdemeanor lawyers to plead cases and clear dockets); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 21 (2004). 
104 Compare Steinberg, Beyond Lawyering, supra note 77, at 633 (describing holistic defense 
as a “crime prevention tool”), with Stuart, supra note 67, at 1923 (in which Skid Row police see their 
role as getting the homeless into shelters and treatment). 
105 See generally Jonathan Rapping, Grooming Tomorrow’s Change Agents: The Role of Law 
Schools in Helping to Create a Just Society, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 465 (2015).   
